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ORDERING THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING: A
PROLOGUE TO GUIDELINES
ERNEST W. SCHOELLKOPFF*

The Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 recognizes retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation in equal
measure as the purposes of punishment.' It also establishes
the United States Sentencing Commission' which will promulgate presumptive sentences for criminal offenses according to the seriousness of the crime and the defendant's criminal history. These sentencing guidelines must comport with
the recognized purposes of sentencing." However, Congress
has failed to assign priorities to those purposes, but instead
has left the application of sentencing rationales to the Commission and to the discretion of the sentencing judge. This
failure undermines the practical aims of determinate sentenc-

ing-namely, to structure discretion in sentencing and to
provide consistency and fairness across the range of sentencing practices. Insofar as the Act lacks rational distinctions
among the purposes of sentencing, it affords no real mandate
for just and efficient sentencing and ultimately no real guidance for the sentencing judge. A statement of purpose should
definitively establish priorities among the arguments for punishing criminals and indicate how each rationale should figure in the sentencing decision. So much is a fitting and necessary prologue to fair and rational sentencing practices and to
the elimination of unwarranted disparity in sentencing.
Determinate sentencing corresponds to the modern retributivist theory of punishment, which assumed much of its
political popularity as it puriported to supplant the scientific
theory of rehabilitation as a dominant purpose of sentencing.
While rehabilitation has been thoroughly discredited as a basic justification for criminal punishment, retribution, whether
* A.B. 1983, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1986, University of Notre
Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1984-86.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473 §§ 211-239, 98 Stat. 2022 (1984) (to be codified in sections scattered between 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673, and at 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-998).
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2) (West 1985).
3. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 991-998 (West Supp. 1985).
4. See id. §§ 991(b)(2), 994(a)(2).
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it entails the mere denunciation of prohibited acts or expiation for crimes committed, proves deficient on moral and policy grounds as a central justifying purpose. The real value of
retribution lies in the limitations it can provide in a criminal
justice system based on deterrence and incapacitation-setting the bounds within which sanctions may be imposed. As such, retribution remains the basic concept underlying the substantive sentencing guidelines. Still, the central
justifying aims of sentencing may be appropriately found in
the context of crime control, the immediate aim of the criminal code reform and of criminal law as a whole.
Accordingly, the purpose section of the Sentencing Reform Act should be amended, or refined by a policy statement of the Sentencing Commission, to recognize deterrence
and incapacitation as the primary justifications for sentencing. These relate directly to the prevention of crime, the
raison d'&tre of the criminal law. Moreover, sanctions should
be limited by retributivist considerations inasmuch as they
are enacted in the sentencing guidelines. The utilitarian principle of parsimony, requiring the least punitive sanction necessary to attain desired social ends, and the availability of
restitutionary remedies together should further limit the severity of particular sentences. Rehabilitation should be relegated to an expressed policy consideration which may merely
guide the reasoning of a sentencing judge. Finally, the need
to treat like cases alike (isonomy) should serve as an important guiding principle.
Thus ordered, the purposes of sentencing will provide
sentencing judges with a viable framework for implementing
the sentencing guidelines and the policy statements of the
Sentencing Commission, as well as a rationally conceived
starting point from which principled sentencing practices
might ensue.
I.

SENTENCING PURPOSES AND THE NEW FEDERAL LAW

A.

The Statutory Scheme

The new federal criminal code comprehensively revamps
the law of sentencing. The sentencing reform provisions establish the Sentencing Commission, an independent commission within the judicial branch. On September 10, 1985,
President Reagan appointed the seven voting members of the
Commission.0 The Attorney General, or his designee, serves
5.

The appointees include Federal District Judge William W. Wil-
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as an ex officio, non-voting member.6
Congress has explicitly set forth the purposes of the
Commission. First, it must establish sentencing policies and
practices that "assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States
Code. 1 7 That section recognizes retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation as legitimate aims of criminal
punishment. A second concern is to provide certainty and
fairness in achieving those aims: to avoid "unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized
sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general
sentencing practices." This practical concern arises as the
criminal justice system attempts to live up to its broader justificatory purposes; the system must balance the desirability
of treating like cases alike with the countervailing objective
of tailoring sentences to individual offenders.
Third, sentencing policies and practices ought to "reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of
human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process."'
To this effect, the Commission must keep abreast of and foster society's effort to understand criminal behavior and to arrive at effective means of confronting it-a terribly elusive
objective which deserves a commitment of such societal proportions as have never been attained or even attempted.
To aid its own efforts, the Commission is to "develop
means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, pekins, Jr. of South Carolina (nominated to be the panel's chairman); Judge
Stephen G. Breyer of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; District of
Columbia Circuit Judge George E. McKinnon; Paul H. Robinson, professor
of Law at Rutgers University; Irene Nagel, -professor of law at Indiana University; Michael K. Block, associate professor of management and economics at the University of Arizona; and Helen G. Corrothers, the United
States Parole Commisioner for the Western Region of Arkansas. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1985, at A15, col. 1. The Sentencing Reform Act had
required that the Commission include at least three active federal judges
selected from a list of six recommended by the Judicial Conference of the
United States. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a). Subsequent legislation allows the President to appoint senior as well as active federal judges. Pub. L. No. 99-22,
99 Stat. 46 (1985).
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a) (West Supp. 1985).
7. Id. § 991(b)(1)(A).
8. Id. § 991(b)(1)(B).
9. Id. § 991(b)(1)(C).
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nal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the
10
purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2).9
In sum, the Act entrusts the Commission with the onerous
but necessary responsibility of implementing the purposes of
punishment in sentencing practice, the results of which
should be generally consistent and equitable while evincing a
regard for individual offenders and cases, and which will be
open to criminological advances. Moreover, the Commission
is required not only to issue sentencing guidelines, but also to
promulgate general policy statements regarding the application of those guidelines, "or any other aspect of sentencing
or sentence implementation that in the view of the Commission would n further the purposes set forth in section
3553(a)(2).""
Hence, the purposes of sentencing are central to all the
work of the Commission. Unfortunately, section 3553(a)(2) is
an unsatisfactory starting point. The provision bears no
marks of an attempt to analyze the purposes of sentencing in
a manner which might prove of any guidance to a sentencing
judge. The court will simply consider the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.
B.

Understating the Purposes of Sentencing

On its face, the subsection simply states the four popularly accepted justifications for criminal punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation, respectively. The provision neither gives greater weight to one
purpose than to another, nor defines the extent to which the
purposes may overlap. In fact, Congress deliberately eschewed stating a preference for one purpose over another
"in the belief that different purposes may play greater or
10.
11.

Id. § 991(b)(2).
Id. § 994(a)(2).
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lesser roles in sentencing for different types of offenses committed by different types of defendants." 1" The Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report continues: "The intent of subsection (a)(2) is to recognize four purposes that sentencing in
general is designed to achieve, and to require that the judge
consider what impact, if any, each particular purpose should
have on the sentence in each case." 1 At face value, the Committee's understatement of the purpose section recoils even
further from the notion of an ordered statement of purpose
designed to provide affirmative guidance for sentencing
judges, in spite of the provision's centrality within the statute
itself. Rather, the Sentencing Commission may evaluate the
extent to which each purpose is to be served as it prescribes a
presumptive sentence for each particular offense. For certain
while collar offenses, the Commission might emphasize deterrence rather than rehabilitation or incapacitation. By contrast, incapacitation may emerge as the chief rationale in
cases involving repeat violent offenders. 4
Nowhere does the statute discuss how these purposes relate to each other, particularly as the judge will apply them in
a particular case to a particular offender. As they stand, the
court might employ each of the stated rationales as it sees fit,
and in any of their myriad formulations and combinations.
The purposes of the Act may contradict each other; after all,
their respective merits have been debated by moral philosophers throughout history. In the worst situation, the judge
might ignore the purposes of sentencing and rely exclusively
on the relatively certain mechanical application of the guidelines, contrary to the intentions -of Congress in drafting the
new sentencing code.15 Such a result may obtain under Congress' eclectic statement of sentencing purposes. Variations in
sentencing rationales may be appropriate when the judge exercises his structured discretion and makes individual sen12. S. REP. No. 223, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1983).
13. Id.
14. Sentencing Reform: The Probable Effect on the Federal Justice System of
Abolition of Indeterminate Sentences and Parole in the Context of a Sentencing
Guidelines System (Dep't of Justice memorandum), in Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1437 and S.31, S. 45., S. 181, S.
204, S.260, S.888, S.979, and S. 1221-PartXIII, Sentencing and General
Codification, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9200, 9205 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Hearing].
15. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL
ACT OF 1983, S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3235-36. [hereinafter cited as SENATE COMM.].
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tencing decisions, but they are not appropriate at the very
core of a statute devised to facilitate fair and consistent sentencing practices. Commenting on the issue of uniformity,
the English Court of Appeal has noted the difference concisely: "We are not aiming at uniformity of sentence; that
would be impossible. We are aiming at uniformity of
approach.""6
To avoid an abdication of the judicial role in sentencing,
purposes of sentencing should be refined to reflect a legal
cognizance of the complexities involved in reaching a truly
just sentencing decision, and to provide judges with far more
guidance as they attempt to adhere to those purposes. The
report of the Yale Law School Sentencing and Parole Study
recommended that Congress assign priorities to the specific,
declared goals of the sentencing process, and not delegate
this matter to sentencing judges or the Sentencing Commission. 17 Congress definitely should have confronted the purposes of punishment with less propitiation toward their respective proponents. Specifically, the hearings indicate that
rehabilitation may have been included among the stated purposes of sentencing only because there are those who feel
that rehabilitation cannot be dismissed, regardless of its deficiencies as a moral theory of punishment and its practical
inefficacy. 8
C.

The Need to Structure Discretion Through Priorities

The confusion among the purposes of sentencing has
posed a seemingly irremovable obstacle to the administration
of criminal justice. The Model Penal Code of 1962 proposed
eight general purposes to govern the sentencing and treatment of offenders." But the commentary expressly shunned
16. The Queen v. Bibi, 71 Crim. App. 360, 361-62 (1980), quoted in
McIntyre, Sentencing: Time for Clear Standards, 27 CRIM. L.Q. 212, 213

(1984).
17. Hearing, supra note 14, at 8909-10 (statement of Pierce
O'Donnell, Michael J. Churgin and Dennis E. Curtis).
18. See id. at 8874-75, 8883 (testimonies of Hon. Marvin E. Frankel
and Norman A. Carlson).
19. The Model Code provides:
The general purposes of the provisions governing the sentencing and treatment of offenders are:
(a) to prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) to promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders;
(c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or
arbitrary punishment;
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the prescription of a formula for applying those purposes:
The section is drafted in the view that sentencing and
treatment policy should serve the end of crime prevention.
It does not undertake, however, to state a fixed priority
among the means to such prevention, i.e. the deterrence of
potential criminals and the incapacitation and correction of
the individual offender. These are all proper goals to be
pursued in social action with respect to the offender, one or
another of which may call for the larger emphasis on a particular context or situation.20
Uncertainty has pervaded judicial attempts to enliven the
purposes of sentencing, with the ultimate and apparently unavoidable resort to discretion. In State v. Ivan, 1 the defendant
appealed the imposition of the maximum fine of $5,000 and
a prison term of one to two years on grounds that the trial
judge entertained a preconceived policy that a bookmaking
conviction merited the sentence imposed without regard to
the circumstances of the individual offender. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the trial court
in view of the defendant's involvement in the larger operation of organized crime, which demanded stern treatment for
deterrent purposes. Chief Justice Weintraub commented:
No single aim or thesis [of sentencing policy] can claim
scientific verity or universal support. Agreement can hardly
be expected until much more is known about human behavior. Until then, the sentencing judge must deal with the
complex of purposes, determining in each situation how the
public interest will best be served .

. .

. There can be no

precise formula. The matter is embedded deeply in individ(d) to give fair warning of the nature of the sentence that may
be imposed on conviction of an offense;
(e) to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualization in their treatment;
(f) to define, coordinate and harmonize.the powers, duties and
functions of the courts and of administrative officers and agencies
responsible for dealing with offenders;
(g) to advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods
and knowledge in the sentencing and treatment of offenders;
(h) to integrate responsibility for the administration of the correctional system in a State Department of Correction [or other
single department or agency].
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 commentary at 5 (Tentative Draft No.

2 1954).
21.

33 N.J. 197, 162 A.2d 851 (1960).
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ual discretion."2
Beyond the constraints of due process" and the eighth
amendment's prohibitions of excessive bail, excessive fines,
and cruel and unusual punishment, 4 discretion has lacked
any clear, substantive definition. With a determinate sentencing policy, Congress sought to structure individual discretion
by authorizing the Sentencing Commission to formulate
guidelines rather than a precise formula for arriving at a sentencing decision. An ordered statement of the purposes of
sentencing would provide an infrastructure for the operation
of those guidelines. Moreover, it can unravel the general confusion of sentencing purposes2 5 yet leave the discretion of the
sentencing court intact. Moreover, an ordered statement
would facilitate the exercise of discretion by channeling it according to priorities and interrelationships among the stated
purposes.
For all its detail, the Sentencing Reform Act appears beset with what British penologist Nigel Walker perceives as a
fear of incorporating philosophy into the penal system, a fear
shared by lawyers, administrators, prison staffs, probation officers, penal reformers, and even penologists." At first
glance, a mandate that the law of sentencing reflect the utmost in academic sophistication would appear thoroughly unworkable at all levels of the criminal justice system. However,
it is not unreasonable to demand from the system a sincere
effort to spell out its purposes so that each component of the
22.

Id. at 201, 853.

23. "[lilt is now clear that the sentencing process. . . must satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion per Stevens, J.).
24. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
25. This confusion of purposes needs to be unraveled and the
precise social justification for a particular confinement should be
forthrightly recognized. It is only in this manner that we can think
clearly about the conditions and extent of confinement, and rationally evaluate our response to disturbing behavior that warrants
societal intervention. Of course, more than one purpose may be
served by a particular confinement. But we should be clear as to
which purpose justifies which punitive or rehabilitative action.
Hearing, supra note 14, at 8909 (statement of Pierce O'Donnell, Michael J.
Churgin and Dennis E. Curtis, quoting Hon. David L. Bazelon).
26. N. WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 1 (1969). See also
N. WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA, at viii (1980); Moore, The
Moral and Metaphysical Sources of the CriminalLaw, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NoMOS XXVII 11, 25 (J.R. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1985) [hereinafter
cited as CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
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sentencing process might be infused with a greater understanding of its function. Above any sort of uniform procedures and guidelines, a strong consensus regarding the details
and interrelationships of the purposes of punishment will be
the first step toward eliminating unjustified disparity and general uncertainty in sentencing. In Section IV of this article, I
propose a delineation of those purposes so as to facilitate a
consistent and rational sentencing methodology.
Guidelines represent legitimate attempts to mitigate
overall disparity in sentencing, to provide a judge with objective, quantified data, to separate the sentencing result from
the vagaries of each judge, and to persuade the offender that
his punishment is the result of a rational process rather than
chance.17 The new federal law requires the Sentencing Commission to design guidelines with an essentially normative approach, as opposed to a strictly empirical one. Nonetheless,
empirical data will prove indispensable in the formulation of
the guidelines. Average sentences handed down in past cases
serve as a starting point from which the Commission may develop a sentencing range that is consistent with the stated
purposes of sentencing.28
In general terms, the sentencing guidelines system seeks
to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparity by providing a
suggested sentencing range for a particular offense committed by a defendant with a particular history and characteristics. The judge may impose a sentence outside the guidelines
range only in light of a significant aggravating or mitigating
factor, and such a sentence is subject to appellate review. The
guidelines may also eliminate disparity among sentencing
practices of different judicial districts, as well as disparity
caused by the differences in the sentencing statutes which apply to regular adult offenders, youthful offenders and drug
addicts."
Essentially, the guidelines are means of facilitating the
purposes of sentencing. Insofar as the statute inadequately
27. Yanoff, Mathematics: An Aid to Sentencing, STATE CT. J., Spring
1983, at 4, 12.
28. 18 U.S.C.A. § 994(m) (West Supp. 1985). By contrast, Massachusetts, Philadelphia and Denver have attempted a purely empirical approach
(the Albany method) which does not supply an analytical framework for
judging and modifying past practices. See von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelines for Sentencing: The Critical Task for the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164, 173-74 (1982).
29. Hearing, supra note 14, at 9207-08 (Dep't of Justice
memorandum).
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describes those purposes, the guidelines will not substantially
aid the development of more equitable sentencing practices.
Kenneth Feinberg has criticized the federal law of sentencing previous to the 1984 Act for having no agreed-upon
philosophy of criminal sanctions. Because Congress failed to
place its imprimatur on one or more purposes of sentencing,
judges were able to impose a sentence in a particular case
with any combination of philosophical justifications in
mind.3 0 The new law does not improve matters much by simply authorizing four purposes of sentencing. Judges and administrators can still make capricious decisions as long as they
can channel their reasoning into any or all of those four pigeon holes. What is needed, then, is a coherent statement delineating the purposes of sentencing to be implemented
through the guidelines, especially as the purposes relate to
each other, to the need for even-handed sentencing practices,
and to society's advances in the understanding of criminal
behavior.
II.

DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE FLIGHT FROM
REHABILITATION TO JUST DESERTS

A.

Political Disillusionment with the "Treatment Model"

With its presumptive sentencing scheme and administrative sentencing guidelines, the Sentencing Reform Act abolishes the indeterminate sentence and parole release. The political renunciation of the indeterminate sentence began in
the early 1970's and was precipitated by a resurgence among
scholars of the retributivist justification for punishment. One
of the leading proponents of retribution or "just deserts,"
Andrew von Hirsch, encapsulated the credo: "Someone who
infringes the rights of others . . .does wrong and deserves
blame for his conduct. It is because he deserves blame that
the sanctioning authority is entitled to choose a response that
expresses moral disapproval: namely, punishment."'"
30. Feinberg, Sentencing Reform and the Proposed Federal Criminal
Code, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 226 (1982).
31. A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 48-49 (1976). See also D. FOGEL, WE
ARE THE LIVING PROOF (1975). Von Hirsch recently reaffirmed his position
that punishment should focus on the crime and not the criminal in light of
the debate over dangerous offenders.
Desert theorists claim that punishment is essentially a condemnatory institution and, hence, that penalties should be distributed according to the degree of blameworthiness of the criminal conduct.
In order to reflect blameworthiness, the system should observe the
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The return to retribution signified a scholarly and also a
popular dissatisfaction with inconsistencies in the setting and
administration of criminal penalties, and with the goal of rehabilitation as a central justifying purpose of sentencing.
Modern rehabilitative penology arose in the latter half of the
nineteenth century and has incorporated indeterminate
sentences as an integral part of its scheme. In 1870, the National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline
recommended complete indeterminacy of sentences, which
would leave the authorities unlimited time to reform prisoners." The modern statement of the rehabilitative ideal has
grown out of the behavioral sciences and their attempts to
describe and manipulate the relationships between individuals and society.3
To bring scientific treatment of an offender to fruition,
advocates of rehabilitation have advocated indeterminate
sentences. Supposedly, the date of release depends upon the
individual's progress and hence cannot be forecast in advance. 4 David J. Rothman has thus compared the indeterminate sentence with the flexible, extended and open-ended
schedule the psychiatrist uses. 5
The treatment model does not include aspects of moral
rehabilitation which lie at the heart of traditional expiatory
retribution, but the idea of rehabilitating offenders need not
lack the virtues of utility and mercy. Jeremy Bentham, the
father of modern utilitarianism, stated: "It is a great merit in
a punishment to contribute to the reformation of the offender,
not only through fear of being punished again, but by a
change in his character and habits."" However, Bentham
would counsel against a view of punishment as part of an ideordinal requirements of desert: to punish equally reprehensible
criminal conduct equally, and to grade punishments so that their
severity comports with the rank ordering of seriousness of crimes.
A. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES 41-42 (1985).
32. National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline,
Statement of Principles,in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE 541-547 (1871).
33. See F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-41 (1964).
34. See B. WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 111 (2d ed.
1981).
35. Rothman, Doing Time: Days, Months and Years in the CriminalJustice System, in SENTENCING 374, 380-81 (1981). Rothman argues for shortened sentences and for pursuing alternatives to imprisonment from "the
failure model" of incarceration.
36. J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 338-39 (C. Ogden ed.
1931).
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alistic plan to transform the human race.37 These grand aspirations are an integral part of traditional retributivism. Sir
Francis Palgrave linked the penal philosophy of the medieval
churchmen to rehabilitation. Punishment was not to be
"thundered in vengeance for the satisfaction of the state, but
imposed for the good of the offender: in order to afford the
means of amendment and to lead the transgressor to repentance, and to mercy." 38
While the traditional retributivists emphasized moral rehabilitation, their modern counterparts have addressed the
potential horrors of a therapeutic state governed by principles of scientific rehabilitation. If one further perceives rehabilitation as an attempt to adjust the criminal law to positivist,
scientific or secular humanist theories of punishment-in effect, to substitute medicine for morals-then the shift to a
retributivist approach becomes expedient and attractive. A
system of social hygiene can squelch individual responsibility
and free will, and result not only in the depersonalization of
the criminal, but also in a loss of individual freedom through
systematic manipulation. 9
Rehabilitation raged as a paramount justification for
criminal punishment into the 1960's and found approval in
the Model Penal Code of 1962, in which the sentencing provisions heavily emphasize the prospects of reforming offend40
ers and containing those who present a danger to society.
The first determinate sentencing laws constituted a significant departure from the rehabilitative model. In fact, determinate sentencing connotes the abandonment of clinical rehabilitation as a major purpose of imprisonment. 1
37.
38.
TERS 13

Id. at 359.
G.

DALZELL, BENEFITS OF CLERGY IN AMERICA AND RELATED MAT-

(1955).

39. Taylor, Retribution, Responsibility and Freedom: The Fallacy of Modern Criminal Law from a Biblical-Christian Perspective, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1981, at 51. See also Lewis, The HumanitarianTheory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224 (1953); Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52
MONIST 475 (1968).
40. See especially sections 6.06, 6.07, 6.08, 6.09, 6.13, 7.01, 7.03,
7.04, 7.07 and respective commentaries. Note, however, that deterrence
and retribution are mentioned as important considerations in these sections
and other places in the Model Code.
41. Fogel, Justice, Not Therapy: A New Mission for Corrections, 62 JUDICATURE 373, 374 (1979).
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B.

The Legislative Responses

California and Indiana were first to enact laws creating
determinate sentences. Since the California sentencing code
was enacted in 1976, a number of bills have been passed to
lengthen the prescribed terms for various crimes. The legislature has also acted to restore some of the judicial and parole
discretion removed by the legislative sentencing provisions
and to widen the range between the presumptive term and
the aggravated term. These piecemeal additions have been
criticized sharply: they were made with little apparent concern for proportionality or consistency among the penalties
for different crimes, or for the new penalties' impact on a
correctional system having limited prison capacity. 2 Von
Hirsch has assailed Indiana's sentencing code for prescribing
draconian penalties for many felonies. Despite its alleged aim
of limiting discretion, it gives wide discretion to judges in
their choice of aggravated or mitigated term, and to correctional administrators to confer or withdraw the fifty percent
good-time allowance.' A judge is permitted to increase but
not decrease a sentence on rehabilitative grounds-that is, if
the defendant is "in need of correctional or rehabilitative
treatment that can best be provided by his commitment to a
penal facility.""" This limitation on judicial discretion has
been attacked as unwarranted and as a hard-line, punitive
law-and-order approach-statutory reform with a vengeance.' 8 These provisions may amount not only to ill-considered public policy, but also to violations of the eighth amendment. It has been proposed that these determinate
sentencing statutes are constitutionally defective because
their penalty terms have been fixed arbitrarily by legislatures
without giving adequate and systematic consideration
to the
4
offense and to the severity of the punishment. '
42. Von Hirsch, supra note 28, at 167.
43. Id. at 167.
44. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7(b)(3) (Burns Supp. 1985).
45. Orland, Is Determinate Sentencing an Illusory Reform?, 62 JUDICATURE 381, 386-87 (1979).
46. Dora Nevares-Muniz cites the Supreme Court's holding in
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909), that the eighth amendment's
prohibitions of excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment impose a requirement of proportionality in criminal sentencing,
and contends that the determinate sentencing statutes fail the test of proportionality. Nevares-Muniz, The Eighth Amendment Revisited: A Model of
Weighted Punishments, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 272 (1984). The proportionality requirement has been upheld most recently in Solem v. Helm,
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Von Hirsch has suggested that these jurisdictions' choice
of rulemaker, the legislature, is partially responsible for the
perceived inadequacies.4 7 By contrast, Oregon has given the
task of establishing sentencing guidelines to its parole
board. 8 Finally, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Washington
have followed the suggestion of former United States District
Court Judge Marvin E. Franke 4 and established sentencing
commissions to draft and effectuate appropriate guidelines.
To date, only Minnesota has developed and implemented a
system of guidelines.5 0
The new federal criminal code follows the route of sentencing guidelines and concomitantly rejects rehabilitation as
a justification for imprisonment: "Almost everyone involved
in the criminal justice system now doubts that rehabilitation
can be induced reliably in a prison setting, and is now quite
certain that no one can really detect whether or when a prisoner is rehabilitated." 51 Feinberg has commented on the
1982 version of the Act 5" and applauded the elimination of
the indeterminate sentence as a waste product of the outmoded rehabilitative rationale:
It is ironic that the well-intentioned purposes underlying
the rehabilitation model and the indeterminate sentence
have, in reality, promoted the type of arbitrariness and unfairness that have served as a catalyst for recent sentencing
reform efforts. Once one concludes that the idea of rehabilitation is fundamentally flawed, one is led to the conclusion
that sentencing reform must begin with a direct broadside
attack on the heart of the existing system-the indetermi463 U.S. 277 (1983) (sentence of life imprisonment without parole for uttering a no account check for $100 held disproportionate and violative of
the eighth amendment, despite defendant's extensive history of minor felonies). See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
47. Von Hirsch, supra note 28, at 167-168.
48. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 144.110-125, 144.775-790 (1981). See A. VON
HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE 92-96, 123-29 (1976).
49.

M.

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WiTHoUr ORDER 118-23

(1972).
50.

Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 16 MINN.
244 app. at 244 (West Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as
Minn. Guidelines].
51. SENATE COMM., supra note 15, at 38, 41.
52, S.1630, 97th. Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
STAT.ANN. ch.
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nate sentence and parole release."
Although the 1984 Act includes rehabilitation as a purpose of sentencing, section 994(k) removes that purpose from
the possible reasons for imposing a prison term: "The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for
the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment." Also, section
994(s) states that rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall
not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason
for sentence reduction.
These limitations on the role of rehabilitation reflect an
awareness that the average prison is by no means conducive
to the reform of criminals. Prisons are demoralizing" and
often appallingly dangerous. 5 To expose a convicted offender indefinitely to an environment which cannot realistically help the offender become a better person is practically
misguided, economically wasteful and ethically outrageous,
particularly when such punishment is inflicted under the pretext of rehabilitation. On the other hand, to separate utterly
notions of rehabilitation and reform from prison policy
might produce an even more inhumane prison setting:
The abandonment of rehabilitation and the return to a
punishment rationale may have a profound effect on prison
staff. It can lead to the ascendency, once again, of custodial
and punitive perspectives. More seriously, it could lead to
abandonment of what little impact rehabilitative, humanistic treatment approaches has [sic] had on prison staffs."
In a similar vein, it has been observed that "[g]iving up entirely on the possibility
of rehabilitation would be unwise and
57
un-Christian."

Determinate sentencing is by and large a legislative reac53.

Feinberg, supra note 30, at 222.

54.

See A.

ROSETT & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS
IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 145-59 (1976).

55. See Engel & Rothman, The Paradoxof Prison Reform: Rehabilitation,
Prisoner'sRights, and Violence, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 413 (1984). The
authors demonstrate that humanitarian reforms within prisons have actually contributed to unrest and violence among inmates. See also Wilson,
"What Works?" Revisited: New Findings on Criminal Rehabilitation, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1980, at 3.
56.
57.

Orland, supra note 45, at 385.
Reese, Demythologizing Crime, 1-51 AMERICA 213, 215 (1984).
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tion to the failure of rehabilitation as a primary, justifying
principle of criminal punishment. As determinate sentencing
enlivens the rationale of just deserts, it tends to advance that
rationale toward preeminence in the order of sentencing purposes. Such preeminence should properly forward the efficient and equitable administration of criminal justice, but it
should also serve to vindicate the act of punishment in general and as it is imposed in a particular case. Just deserts fails
on these latter counts. The aims of punishment must be
structured in view of the common objective of all criminal
prohibitions-the prevention of the sanctioned behavior
itself.58
The utilitarian policies of deterrence and incapacitation
are essentially forward-looking justifications, assessing punishment in terms of its propensity to modify the future behavior
of the criminal (as in incapacitation and special deterrence)
and of others who might be tempted to commit crimes (as in
general deterrence), while the retributive view looks backward and focuses upon the offense as the crucial determinant
of punishment.5 9 Because the sentencing decision must be
justified in terms of the consequences it will hold for the offender, the penal system and society at large, retribution fails
as a comprehensive rationale for punishment. On the other
hand, deterrence and incapacitation properly take account of
the criminal act in the context of the imminent social policy
of crime prevention. In their concern to eliminate disparity
in sentencing along with any appreciable reliance on the
treatment model, just deserts theorists have overstated the
moral capabilities of the retributive principle. Fixing the legal
inquiry upon the criminal act alone may be a convenient solution to the disparity problem, but it will leave unaddressed
the many questions about the individual and social consequences of particular sentencing practices-questions which
go to the heart of the sentencing process.
C.

TraditionalExpiatory Retribution and Moral Reform

A shift from rehabilitation to retribution entails a divorce between those two concepts, which were unified in the
traditional moral view of punishment. Traditional retributivist justifications for punishment were aimed at the reform
58.
(1968).
59.

See H.

PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

See id. at 11.

62-70
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of the offender, albeit from a moral rather than a scientific
perspective. St. Thomas Aquinas maintained that natural equity demands that a man should be deprived of the good
against which he acts, for he thereby renders himself unworthy of that good.6 0 Wrongdoing is the misuse for an evil purpose of a power which belongs to man for the attainment of
good. Because an offender has misused such a power, the offender deserves to be deprived of it or restrained in the use
of it through imprisonment."
Kant's view of punishment, as elaborated by Hegel and
English Hegelians Bradley and Bosanquet, stressed two highly
paradoxical ideas: first, that a criminal is honored by his punishment, since punishment is an implicit tribute to his status
as a morally responsible person; and second, that the offender must have consented somehow to his own punishment
as essential to his spiritual welfare.62 Sir Walter Moberly
notes the connection between the Kantian theory and two
biblical passages:6"
Whom the Lord loveth He correcteth; even as a father the
son in whom he delighteth.6 '
If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons
. . .but if ye be without chastisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards, and not sons."
Finally, Pope Pius XII suggested a necessary relationship
between retribution and rehabilitation. The meaning and
purpose of punishment are to bring the violator back into the
order of duty by compelling the criminal to suffer." Vindictive punishment helps the offender toward a definitive rehabilitation, "provided man himself does not raise barriers to
its efficacy, which, indeed, is in no way opposed to the purpose of righting and restoring disturbed harmony."6 Liberation from guilt ensues, and only then does the transgressor
become reunited with his society and his God. In sum, the
60.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

bk. 3, ch. 145 (.

Rickaby trans. 1950).

61. Hawkins, Punishment and Moral Responsibility, 7 MOD. L. REV. 205,
208 (1944).
62. W. MOBERLY, THE ETHics OF PUNISHMENT 113 (1968).
63. Id.at 114.
64. Proverbs 3:12.
65. Hebrews 12:7-8.
66. Pius XII, Crime and Punishment, 6 CAT. LAW. 92, 94 (1960).
67. Id.at 97.
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traditional moral view of punishment assumes a rational and
morally responsible offender, and an institution of criminal
punishment that can offer the offender the opportunity to
make himself morally whole, or at least to rectify (on some
metaphysical level) the universal relations which the criminal
has disturbed by his misdeed.
The traditional conception of retributive justice, then, is
an idealistic one and intimately related to spiritual reform.
Unfortunately, there are untold barriers to the spiritual and

moral efficacy of vindictive punishment. To begin with, if we
are concerned with the personality of the offender, should
not punishment properly focus on rehabilitation rather than
retribution? A.C. Ewing has argued so in terms of Kantian
imperatives: "Retributive justice may be a very good thing,
but the saving of souls is a much better thing."" Furthermore, considerations of public policy may be paramount in
any particular sentencing decision, and even more important
in a system of guidelines to be applied across the entire range
of criminal acts and offenders subject to adjudication. Deterrence and incapacitation are almost always primary considerations in the imposition of criminal sanctions. However, inadequate resources and poor rehabilitative climates have
defeated the therapeutic aims of traditional retributive justice, just as these problems have rendered scientific rehabilitation a failure as an operative principle.
The traditional expiatory form of retribution makes a
further unrealistic assumption that the defendant will commit
himself to moral reform. Moberly concludes: "In short, retribution, when fully understood, includes the moral amendment of the wrongdoer. Where there is no such amendment,
retribution remains incomplete and unsatisfying. " 9 The ability of punishment to reform presumes that the offender has
some rudimentary conscience, some latent sense of guilt and
some respect for the court which punishes him."0 But here
again, the present criminal justice system cannot promote the
expiatory requirements of the retributive theory. In prison,
the offender faces strong possibilities of homosexual rape,
drug addiction, total demoralization and a stigma which may
never depart. Typically, prisons offer little hope of amendment. They only exacerbate the alienation that the offender
has experienced through the criminal act. On balance, incar68.
69.
70.

A.C. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT 18 (1929).
W. MOBERLY, supra note 62, at 120.
Id. at 136.
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ceration has the effect of excluding the criminal from truly
reformative influences and leaves the criminal angry, despondent, frighteningly impressionable and unregenerate. 1
By and large, the claims of the traditional retributivists
have been far too ambitious, just as the objectives of rehabilitation have proved unworkable in penal systems as we have
come to know them. Furthermore, the nature of retributive
theory in itself may place it outside the scope of legitimate
social legislation. Jeffrie Murphy suggests that strong positive
retributivism - the view that desert values function as the
primary justifying reasons for punishment does not
amount to a goal which is the state's proper business to pursue. Instead, weak positive retributivism, or the view that retributive values function as secondary components of the general justifying aim of punishment, is the most that could ever
be defended:
In constitutional terms, the pursuit of retributive values
might represent a permissible or even rational state interest. It might be difficult to demonstrate, however, that the
pursuit of such values could be a compelling state interest
- the only kind of interest sufficient to justify the encumbrance of fundamental rights involved in the practice of
punishment. 2
Realistically, retributive purposes can properly serve only
as subordinate principles to the justifying aims of punishment. Those aims must represent a compelling state interest
in furtherance of the substantive criminal law (which must
also pass constitutional muster), the breach of which has occasioned a penalty. The compelling state interest rightly encompasses nothing other than the goals of deterring the offender from future prohibited acts, of incapacitating him if it
is necessary to prevent further criminal acts on his part, and
of deterring others from illegal conduct.
71. See id. at 137-38. Overcrowded and generally atrocious prison
conditions also form strong arguments for the increased use of probation
and alternative sentences. See Anderson, Probation: Its Unfulfilled Potential,
152 AMERICA 281 (1985); Andrews & Kanner, Tailoringthe Sentence to Fit the
Criminal, UPDATE ON LAw-RELATED EDUC., Winter 1982, at 18; Rothman,
supra note 35.

72.

Murphy, Retributivism and the State's Interest in Punishment, in

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 156, 162.
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JUST DESERTS: INHIBITING CRIME PREVENTION

Hedonism and Skepticism: Deforming Sentencing Policy

Modern just deserts theorists ignore the realities of our
legal and penal system to a degree not approached by their
traditional counterparts and at a time when these realities
should be all the more earnestly attended to. Just deserts advocates have thrown out the reformist aspect of retribution
altogether and have fallen back on the mere disapproval of
criminal conduct as sufficient grounds for punishment. Von
Hirsch's statement of the theory of commensurate deserts is
susceptible to this criticism.7 8 Deriving a sanction proportionate to the crime committed from the assumption that most
human behavior is volitional amounts to an incomplete and
unsatisfying response. Current retributivist thought attempts
to vindicate an ultimately hedonistic expression of society's
disapproval and is thus fraught with moral skepticism just
when the exigencies of criminal justice demand intelligent,
pragmatic decisions from sentencing courts. Ethically, just
deserts may amount to little more than a sophisticated way of
licensing vengeance-hardly a basis for socially responsible
sentencing practices.
The just deserts rationale is hedonistic in its focus on fulfilling the desires of the punishing society and in its apparent
disregard for the broad consequences which the institution of
criminal punishment holds for society itself. Moreover, just
deserts reflects moral skepticism in its attempt to confer
moral legitimacy to an impassioned response to a social
problem.
John Dewey criticized Jeremy Bentham's brand of utilitarianism (particularly his description of welfare in units of
pleasure and pain) for confusing utilitarianism with hedonism. 7 ' Dewey noted that John Stuart Mill "brought utilitarianism in closer accord with the unbiased moral sense of man73.

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

AMERICAN FRIENDS SER-

VICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 145 (1971) presents a well-intentioned but likewise insufficient retributivist response to unbounded judicial
discretion in sentencing. The authors suggest that the law should deal only
with the individual's criminal behavior and ignore extralegal circumstances. See also A. DERSHOWITZ, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 24 (1976).
For a general discussion of retributivist responses to sentence disparity, see
Forst, Sentencing Disparity:An Overview of Research and Issues, in SENTENCING
REFORM: ExPERIMENTS IN REDUCING DISPARITY 15-21 (M. Forst ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as SENTENCING REFORM].
74. J. DEWEY, THEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE

94-101 (1960).
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kind when he said that 'to do as you would be done by and to
love your neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection
of utilitarian morality.' 75 Avoiding a skeptical position, a
morally just response to crime must take serious account of
social welfare:
Since this hedonistic element is that which renders utilitarianism vulnerable in theory and unworkable in practice, it is
significant to know that one conception of regard for social
(that is widespread and impartially measured) welfare may
be maintained as a standard of approbation in spite of historic utilitarianism's entanglement with an untenable hedonism ...
Institutions are good not only because of their direct
contribution to well-being but even more because they
favor the development of the worthy dispositions from
which issue noble enjoyments."
B.

Pragmatism and Progress in the Jurisprudenceof Sentencing

Curiously, the policies of just deserts appear to counsel a
formalistic approach to sentencing - the kind of formalism
against which pragmatic legal theorists reacted in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 7 Pragmatic philosophers rejected not only the metaphysical views (characteristic of expiatory retribution) postulating the existence of a reality beyond human experience, but also other formalistic
methods relying on strict verbal solutions, bad a priori reasons, fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins.7 8 To the extent that just deserts theory imposes a sentence strictly from an assumption that a certain
criminal action must meet with a certain predetermined sanction, that theory divorces the sentencing decision from the
social realities which spawned the need to sentence the offender in the first place.
The theory also separates the field of sentencing from
the social sciences and developing technology, in light of the
fact that the chief attempt to implement scientific developments - rehabilitation programs in prisons - proved a misguided failure. Rehabilitation failed because prisons, as they
75. Id. at 97.
76. Id. at 100-01.
77. See R. SUMMERS,
26-28, 33, 136-75 (1982).
78. Id. at 31-33.
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have been maintained in this century, are horrendously inappropriate vehicles for rehabilitating offenders. Nonetheless,
the current state of affairs should by no means dissuade legislators and prison officials from pursuing alternative, nontreatment methods of removing tendencies toward criminal
79
behavior.
Dewey's writings provide a fruitful background for legislative and administrative efforts to improve the sentencing
process. Dewey applied scientific method to ethics itself in order to arrive at a morally just course of action. Following
Dewey's brand of pragmatism, we must look to the consequences of imposing a particular sentence in order to discover the significance of criminal punishment. Ultimately,
morally just sentencing policies must be intelligent attempts
to find proper means of dealing with offenders. Dewey's general theory of moral reconstruction can be tailored to broad
sentencing schemes as well as individual sentencing decisions.
It is at least a sound ethical starting point:
the primary significance of the unique and morally ultimate
character of the concrete situation is to transfer the weight
and burden of morality to intelligence. It does not destroy
responsibility; it only locates it. A moral situation is one in
which judgment and choice are required antecedently to
overt action. The practical meaning of the situation - that
is to say the action needed to satisfy it - is not self-evident.
It has to be searched for. There are conflicting desires and
alternative apparent goods. What is needed is to find the
right course of action, the right good. Hence, inquiry is exacted: observation of the detailed makeup of the situation;
analysis into its diverse factors; clarification of what is obscure; discounting of the more insistent and vivid traits;
tracing the consequences of the various modes of action
that suggest themselves; regarding the decision reached as
hypothetical and tentative until the anticipated or supposed
consequences which led to its adoption have been squared
with actual consequences. This inquiry is intelligence. Our
moral failures go back to some weakness of disposition,
some absence of sympathy, some one-sided bias that makes
us perform the judgment of the concrete case carelessly or
perversely. Wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence
in the face of the disagreeable, balance of interests enabling
us to undertake the work of analysis and decision intelli79.

See F.
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gently are the distinctively moral traits 80
moral excellencies.

the virtues or

This theory argues strongly for individualized and flexible
sentencing practices and for guidelines directed toward making those practices sound ones. To this end, sentencing policies must include an examination of all the relevant circumstances of a crime and the offender, judgment as to which
elements of a particular case are worth addressing through
the sentencing process, an explanation of the consequences
of all available sentencing alternatives, and the realization
that sentencing decisions do not definitively match an offender with the punishment he has merited, but are rather
deliberate attempts to find the best way of dealing with
offenders.
Robert Summers has classified Dewey-along with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Roscoe Pound, John Chipman
Gray, Walter Wheeler Cook, Herman Oliphant and Felix Cohen-as a pragmatic instrumentalist. These theorists were
pragmatic in their concern to serve practical ends through
the complexities of the legal system. 1 For the most part, they
believed that values in general and the goals of rules and
other legal precepts stem from prevailing wants and interests
which are evaluated in quantitative terms only. The general
aim is to maximize the realization of as many wants and interests as possible at the least cost. 82 Justice Holmes expressed
this conventionalist theory of value when he wrote that the
"first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should
correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong." 83 1 Holmes' view reflects the
classical empiricism of the eighteenth century and the skepticism of David Hume.
In the absence of a commitment to intelligent use of sentencing, desert-based sentencing guidelines admit of an essentially skeptical view and fit well within Hume's moral analysis.
The value of the sentencing decision may be determined politically through sentiment, not reason: "Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly unimportant in this particular. The rules of morality,
80.
81.
82.

J. DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (1920).
See R. SUMMERS, supra note 77, at 20-21.
Id. at 43.
83. OW. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41 (1881), quoted in R. SUMMERS,
supra note 77, at 46.
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therefore, are not conclusions of our reason." 8' 4 For Hume,
approval of a certain punishment would render it virtuous.
This sympathy is objectified in artificial virtues, which become associationally linked with natural virtues. Natural virtues are those of which humans simply tend to approve.
Moral significance arises in the criminal justice system when
the instinctive desire to punish is transferred from natural to
artificial virtues, supported by sympathy for the general
good. It follows that punishment, like justice, is a moral virtue, an artificial invention for the good of mankind."
Like Hume, the just deserts theorists have subordinated
conceptual empiricism to an inductive skepticism intended to
raise doubts concerning the operations of human understanding." However useful and interesting these doubts may be
with regard to the working of the human imagination, moral
skepticism hardly provides a measure of guidance in the sentencing decision. A sentencing policy based on the mere approval of certain punishments for certain crimes would not
begin to address the problems of overcrowded prisons, recidivism, poor administration, and other problems which beset
the current criminal justice system. Just deserts introduces
skepticism into sentencing policy. A more pragmatic approach could conceptually eliminate the concern over unwarranted sentence disparity and begin to deal with ways to improve the penal system from the vantage point of the
sentencing judge. A good first step for policymakers would
be to formulate judgments about the perceived goals of the
sentencing process - to order the purposes of sentencing
and thereby express judgments about those purposes in light
of society's experience with their implementation. As Dewey
proposes: 'Judgments about values are judgments about the conditions and the results of experienced objects; judgments about
which should87 regulate the formation of our desires, affections and
enjoyments."1
Moreover, in a pragmatic sentencing scheme, the purposes of sentencing will not serve as fixed ends for the sentencing process now and for all time. "Ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the course of activity and which are
84. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 457 (L.A. Selby-Bigge
2d ed. 1978).
85. See id. at 477-84.
86. On Hume's "doxastic empiricism" and his consequent elevation
of the imagination, see R. FOGELIN, HUME'S SKEPTICISM IN THE TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE 53-63 (1985).
87. J. DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 265 (1929).
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employed to give activity added meaning and to direct its further course. They are in no sense ends of action. In being
ends of deliberation they are redirecting pivots in action."8 8
The purposes of sentencing provide ways of defining, limiting
and guiding sentencing practices, and the further classifications in the sentencing guidelines system, viewed pragmatically, offer specific guidance in dealing with individual crimes
and offenders. "Classifications suggest possible traits to be on
the lookout for in studying a particular case; they suggest
methods of action to be tried in removing the inferred causes
of ill. They are tools of insight; their value is in promoting an
individualized response in the individual situation." 8 9
In this manner, sentencing guidelines can function as vehicles for improving the efficacy of criminal punishment vis-ivis perceived social objectives, with a particular concern for
individualized sentences. The very existence of the guidelines
and the requirement that the sentencing judge must act in
light of the purposes of sentencing will almost certainly curtail unwarranted sentence disparity. However, the Sentencing
Reform Act necessarily sets the stage for far more significant
legal developments. The Act states the purposes of sentencing and provides for appeal from sentences which violate the
law, deviate from the guidelines, or are not addressed within
the scope of the guidelines. " ' The Act contemplates the beginnings of a federal jurisprudence of sentencing. In pragmatic terms, the foregoing sentencing practices may be refined through judicial deliberation. Sentencing decisions will
produce rules to supplement the Sentencing Reform Act and
the work of the Federal Sentencing Commission. Courts will
reevaluate the principles of sentencing as the ultimate means
of judging suggested courses of action."
C.

Implementing the Guidelines: The Judicial Role

Determinate sentencing policies, therefore, may be based
on politically determined "deserved punishments", but cannot properly hamper the judicial role in dispensing individualized sentences. The advocates of rehabilitation have argued
that the sentencing process should focus on the offender
rather than the criminal act.92 A suitable justification for
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

J.

DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCr

J. DEWEY, supra note 80, at 169.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3742 (West 1985).
See J. DEWEY, supra note 74, at 141.
Fogel, supra note 41, at 374.

225 (1930).
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punishment should take both into account. The sentencing
court must support its decision not simply in terms of a prescribed, "deserved" punishment, but more broadly in terms
of the consequences that that sentence will hold for the offender, for those immediately affected by his behavior, for
the penal system, and for the prospective social needs and
goals to be served by criminal justice. Walter Evans and
Frank Gilbert have described the importance of the judicial
role in unqualified terms:
The court is the institution to which society brings its ills
for treatment and resolution, where justice is prescribed
both for society and for the individual. To the extent that
the court is limited in its discretion, it is prevented from
achieving that goal. It is simply not possible to legislate specific solutions for all peculiarities and outcroppings of mankind's social problems. Any attempts to do so may well create a new problem of disparity through an inability to
dispense justice in widely varying circumstances. Only
through an insightful understanding of both the offense
and the offender by an impartial observer can safe, intelligent decisions be made. Arbitrary, mandatory sanctions
portend a frightening failure for a civilized society. "
Furthermore, D.J. Galligan has argued that a strict just
deserts approach will keep the range of penalties high in the
interests of uniformity, and that many non-dangerous offenders will get longer sentences in order to assure that the dangerous offender is severely punished. Also, such an approach
would remove a judge's discretion to treat offenders toward
the bottom of the offense category more leniently than their
deserts might require, in the hope that they might be diverted from a life of crime and incarceration. In short, just
4
deserts might increase significantly the prison population.'
Congress has recognized that sentencing guidelines serve
to structure judicial discretion, not to supplant it. The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary addressed this matter quite
succinctly:
The Committee does not intend that the guidelines be
imposed in a mechanistic fashion. It believes that the sentencing judge has an obligation to consider all the relevant
93.

Evans & Gilbert, The Case for Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 61
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94. Galligan, Guidelines and Just Deserts: A Critique of Recent Trends in
Sentencing Reform, 1981 CRIM. L. REv. 297, 304-05.
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factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines in an appropriate case. The purpose of the sentencing
guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual
offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences. Indeed, the use of sentencing guidelines will actually enhance the individualization of sentences
as compared to [previous] law.0 5
Such language hardly evokes the spirit of just deserts,
which limits the inquiry into the defendant's individual circumstances to criminal history, chiefly on the grounds that it
is offensive to punish a criminal more severely in respect of his
home life or his employment or educational status (a possible
effect of rehabilitation).96 However, there is just as strong a
possibility that such factors could militate in the other direction and reduce the severity of the penalty. In any case, they
help to form a clear picture from which the sentencing judge
can render a fair and impartial decision within coherently
formulated sentencing goals.
While the philosophy of just deserts may have generated
the reform which has culminated in the formation of the Sentencing Commission, retribution should play only a
subordinate role when the purposes of punishment are effected in the guidelines and as the sentencing judge sets out
to apply those guidelines. The traditional retributive theory
manifests at least a formal respect for rights, dignity and autonomy. However, Marxian critics have successfully exposed
the inapplicability of this formal respect in the world as we
know it: 97 "Moral relations and moral restraint are possible
only in genuine communities characterized by bonds of sympathetic identification and mutual aid resting upon a perception of common humanity.

.

.

.In the absence of reciprocity

in this rich sense, moral relations among men will break
down and criminality will increase." 8 Indeed, idealistic retribution reflects a Christian world view that has not translated
well in capitalist society. Retribution will not suffice as an allencompassing justificatory purpose of sentencing.
95. SENATE COMM., supra note 15, at 52-53, 55-56.
96. A. voN HIRSCH, supra note 31.
97. J. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217
(1973).
98. Id. at 235 (paraphrasing Willem Bonger's Criminality and Economic Conditions (1916)).
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The retributivist's difficulty is that he wants the crime
itself to indicate the amount of punishment, which it cannot
do unless we first assume a scale of crimes and penalties.
But on what principles is the scale to be constructed, and
how are new offenses to be fitted into it? These difficulties
admit of no solution unless we agree to examine the consequences to be expected from penalties of different degrees
of severity: i.e., unless we adopt a utilitarian approach. 99

The best approach is more appropriately termed a prag•matic or scientific one - one which will foster continuing
judicial inquiry into -the consequences of certain kinds and
degrees of punishment. Legislators, though, seem to have
embraced just deserts as part of the disassociation from the
treatment model. The complex problems in sentencing demand a greater degree of legislative rationality and candor,
as well as a comprehensive evaluation of the alternative sentencing rationales.
IV.

STRUCTURING THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING TO PROMOTE
THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

A.

The Case for Limiting Retributivism

The more sensitive philosophical inquiries of recent
times have subordinated retribution to the forward-looking
principles of deterrence and incapacitation. John Braithwaite
has insisted that there is a "fundamental irony" between such
utilitarian policies and just deserts: while the latter sets out
with the stronger preoccupation with justice, empirical realities make retribution in practice the source of profound injustice.1 0 0 "The difference is that whereas our attainment of
utilitarian-goals is very imperfect, the quest for just deserts is
worse than imperfect; it is counterproductive. Social structural realities allow us to impose desert only when desert is
least deserved."1 0 1 While this critique may be somewhat overstated, it underscores the need for principled restraint in sentencing-applying the utilitarian principle of parsimony and
choosing the least punitive sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes. 0 2 By itself, the expiation theory treats
99. S. BENN & R. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLrrICAL THOUGHT 219
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100. Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White Collar
Criminals, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723, 724 (1982).
101. Id. at 758.
102. See N. MORRIS. THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 60-61 (1974).

19861

ORDERING PURPOSES OF SENTENCING

all crimes as if they were financial transactions. Herbert L.
Packer condemns the idea that it is simply right to inflict
punishment on offenders in payment for their misdeeds as
"nothing more than dogma, unverifiable and on its face implausible"'0 3 - whether that notion stems from mere denunciatory retribution or from expiation.
There are strong arguments for employing just deserts
as a limiting principle in an operative statement of sentencing
rationales. H.L.A. Hart has suggested that retribution is important primarily in the distribution of punishment, rather
than as a general justifying aim; that is, retribution helps to
determine who may be punished and to what extent.'" Hart
asserts that "there is, for modern minds, something obscure
and difficult in the idea that we should look in choosing punishment to some right intrinsic relation which it must bear to
the wickedness of the criminal's act, rather than the effect of
the punishment on society and on him."'0 5 However, employing the retributive impulse as a limit to the punishment that
society may inflict to prevent future crimes may insure that
an offender receives no greater penalty than he has merited,
while desirable social objectives are pursued. The reformative aspect of traditional retribution, in comparison to the
policies of deterrence and incapacitation, simply does not answer as a forward-looking, action-guiding principle that
might elevate retribution to a central justifying aim of
sentencing.
In his book, Madness and the Criminal Law, Norval Morris
takes Hart's observations one step further and argues that
justice does not in fact "require identity or equality of punishment of the equally deserving; it requires only that they be
punished within a just range of punishments fitted to their
desert."' 0 6 As he downplays the notion that like cases should
be treated alike, Morris allocates the purposes of punishment
through a highly plausible framework and argues that utilitarian values of deterrence are defining purposes of punishment, whereas desert is a limiting principle which prescribes
the other bounds of leniency and severity.10 7 Equality of sen103. H. PACKER, supra note 58, at 38-39.
104. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8-13 (1968).
105. Id. at 163.
106. N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 181 (1982).
107. But see SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 26, at 21.
Walker rejects retribution as a limiting principle because he sees the utilitarian humanitarian principle (the principle of parsimony) as a more felicitous limiting principle and believes that there is little point in adopting
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tencing, however, is but a guiding principle which must give
way to limiting and defining considerations when there is
conflict among such principles.10 8
However, Morris does not explain fully his distinction
between defining and limiting principles of punishment. Semantically, the two terms are virtually indistinguishable, and
it may well be said that just deserts "defines" punishment by
reference to the gravity society imputes to a particular offense. Just deserts also provides a practical definition of punishment by setting limits on the use of a particular sanction.
B.

PrimaryJustificationsfor Punishment: Deterrence and
Incapacitation

Appropriately termed, deterrence is a justifying principle
of punishment, as Hart, Packer and Walker have recognized.
In its broad sense, deterrence refers to the inhibiting effect
that punishment, either actual or threatened, will have on the
actions of those who are otherwise disposed to commit
crimes. In turn, the concept of deterrence is usually divided
into two separate aspects: after-the-fact inhibition of the person being punished, or special deterrence, and inhibition in
advance by threat or example-that is, general deterrence. 9
According to Packer, general deterrence
is the only utilitarian goal of punishment that affords a generalized a priori justification for the infliction of punishment. It is the only goal we can accept in advance for punishing all crimes committed by all persons, without
scrutinizing the facts of the particular case in which punishment may be imposed .

. .

. In contrast, intimidation [or

special deterrence], incapacitation, and rehabilitation are all
partial and fragmentary goals, and their relevance in any
given case is always at issue. 10
But unlike the tenuous rehabilitation rationale, special deterrence and incapacitation are directly related to the pervasive
objective of crime control. Their application is not directly
appropriate to all cases; they seem peculiar grounds for sendboth. But insofar as retribution is a legitimate purpose of sentencing, it
finds its proper expression as a limiting principle (along with parsimony in
punishment and also restitution, where possible) in the structure of sentencing purposes.
108. N. MORRIS, supra note 106, at 182-83.
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Id. at 63.

PACKER,

supra note 58, at 39.
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ing a perjurer or a tax evader to prison, for example,"' since
imprisonment itself cannot prevent repeat offenses in these
cases. Generally, though, the need to restrain the offender
through the intimidation of punishment as well as through
the very fact of the criminal sanction applies to the imposition of sentences for all offenses-subject to the constraints
of just deserts, to the utilitarian principle of parsimony, and
to possibilities for restitution. This focus brings special deterrence and incapacitation within the primary justification of
sentencing, pursuant to the essentially preventive scheme of
the criminal law. After all, crime control is the focal point of
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.112 In 1968,

Hebert Packer fruitfully expounded the preventive function
of the state:
Law, including the criminal law, must in a free society
be judged ultimately on the basis of its success in promoting
human autonomy and the capacity for individual human
growth and development. The prevention of crime is an essential aspect of the environmental protection required if
autonomy is to flourish. It is, however, a negative aspect
and one which, pursued with single-minded zeal, may end
up creating an environment in which all are safe but none is
free. The limitations included in the concept of culpability
are justified not by an appeal to the Kantian dogma of "just
deserts" but by their usefulness in keeping the state's powers of protection at a decent remove from the lives of its
citizens. 8
The limits on the utilitarian goals of punishment set
what Packer calls "an integrated theory of criminal punishment '1 1 4 apart from the strict utilitarian position that punishment must simply achieve more benefit than the harm it produces; it must have a comprehensive purpose to be

considered just.1 5
A theory of criminal punishment which focuses on the
preventive aspect of the criminal law and allows for anisonomic sentences surpasses the traditional retributive theory
in moral value, particularly as it seeks to effect a flexible and
pragmatic concern for the social welfare in the sentencing
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id. at 52.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
H. PACKER, supra note 58, at 65-66.
Id. at 62-70.
See F. ZIMRING, PERSPEVMES ON DETERRENCE 21 (1971).
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process. A system which provides for mercy and clemency
over and above justly deserved penalties will promote "the
embracing and pervasive charity of the Christian ethic""' far
better than any attempt to emulate the Kantian hierarchies
for the purposes of confronting practical social problems.
Morris alludes to the parable of the prodigal son in Luke
15:11-32 and to Pope John Paul II's recent commentary:
The prodigal son, having wasted the property he received
from his father, deserves-after his return-to earn his living by working in his father's house as a hired servant and
possibly, little by little, to build up a certain provision of
material goods, though perhaps never as much as the
amount he had squandered. This would be demanded by
the order of justice. " 7
C.

The Limits of Restitution and Desert

The Pope's words evoke another concept which should
not be ignored in the discussion of sentencing rationales-restitution. " 8 Section 3556 of the Sentencing Reform
Act authorizes restitution orders from the sentencing court.
However, restitution demands more fundamental recognition
as a sentencing principle. Restitution can provide constructive alternatives to prison terms,1 19 especially since the Supreme Court has held that a law which imposes a jail term for
people who cannot afford to pay the statutory fine is unconstitutional.1 2 0 For example, a creative sentence might allow a
burglar to retain his job or to perform community service so
he might earn enough to support his family and to atone for
the damage he has caused. Inside prisons, restitutionary programs could aid the penal system in achieving its rehabilitative purposes as part of prison industries. At any rate, restitution is an important limiting principle of criminal justice.
Sentencing guidelines based on the just deserts model
will serve as limitations from which the sentencing judge
should not depart except to serve the purposes of sentencing
supra note 102, at 206.
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in situations not adequately comprehended by the guidelines.
Such guidelines may often lack precision, but they ground
the sentencing system in the historical facts of offenses and in
the offenders' criminal record-information that the average
citizen can understand and that Courts of Appeals can verify
and evaluate. By contrast, an incapacitative guideline system
focuses on propensities for future conduct and employs a
technology that is becoming increasingly incomprehensible to
citizens and courts alike.12 The Minnesota sentencing guidelines are based on the desert model and are fine exemplars
for the Federal Sentencing Commission's task. The presumptive sentences, calculated from the severity score ascribed to
the offense and considered with the defendant's criminal history, are attempts to arrive at retributive limits to
punishment. 2"
D.

An Amendment to Section 3553(aX2)

More essential to the equitable administration of criminal justice than the existence of the guidelines is a rationally
ordered statement of the purposes under which the court is
to apply the guidelines and hand down a determinate sentence. To this end, section 3553(a)(2) should be amended to
direct the court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, to consider:
(2) the purpose of its sanctions in affording adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct and in protecting
the public from further crimes of the defendant, as
limited by the need to(A) punish the defendant commensurately with the seriousness of the crime;
(B) choose the least punitive sanction necessary to
121. Ozanne, Judicial Review: A Casefor Sentencing Guidelines and Just
Deserts in Sentencing Reform, in SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 73, at 177,
206.
122.
The offense of conviction determines the appropriate severity
level on the vertical axis. The offender's criminal history score
... determines the appropriate location on the horizontal axis.
The presumptive fixed sentence for a felony conviction is found in

the Sentencing Guidelines Grid cell at the intersection of the column defined by the offense severity level. The offenses within the
Sentencing Guidelines Guild are presumptive with respect to the
duration of the sentence and whether imposition or execution of
the felony sentence should be stayed.
Minn. Guidelines, supra note 50, at 264.
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achieve the purposes of deterrence and incapacitation or of any other social policy to be served by the
criminal justice system; or
(C) provide restitution to victims of the defendant's
crime.
This section now establishes deterrence and incapacitation as
the justificatory purposes of sentencing, with just deserts, the
principle of parsimony and restitution as explicit limitations
on the distribution of punishment. The effect of each limitation should be absolute. For instance, should restitution dictate a far less severe punishment than either of the others,
then that least severe alternative must be selected.
Furthermore, the guiding principle of equality or isonomy, is clearly expressed in section 3553(a)(6), which addresses "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct." However, the Commission would
do well to clarify the status of equality as essentially a guiding
consideration and declare rehabilitation of the defendant a
guiding principle apart from the immediate purposes of sentencing in section 3553(a)(2). In the context of sentencing
and the criminal justice system at large, rehabilitation might
be understood best as the effect of punishment in turning the
offender away from criminal activity. This effect is none
other than the aim of special deterrence. In appropriate
cases, it may prove useful for penal agencies to approach the
effect in terms of treatment and rehabilitation. Hence, rehabilitation is a policy which might be used in selected cases to
supplement the comprehensive justificatory and limiting principles of punishment.
Deterrence and incapacitation have assumed the primary
position among sentencing rationales because these objectives
are the chief ways in which sentencing can contribute to
crime control. One may question this outcome in view of the
fact that empirical evidence has not soundly confirmed the
effectiveness of either deterrent or incapacitative policies in
reducing crime rates.12 8 However, it is important to separate

the empirically observable efficacy of the deterrence doctrine

4

2

in the present criminal justice system from the role

123. See PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE FFECTS, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (1978).
124. See Morris & Miller, Predictionsof Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JUST.
1 (1985). The authors indicate the pervasiveness of prediction in the crimi-
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which legislators may freely ascribe to it in prospective social
policy. 2 Criminal prohibitions (such as the one against murder) as well as prescriptions (such as the burden of filing a tax
return) share the aim of compelling socially desired behavior
and discouraging conduct which contradicts the peaceful operation of a humane and morally upright society.
nal justice system and sentencing in particular, and establish a preference
for actuarial predictions over clinical ones which rely on intuitive judgments by psychiatric professionals. Actuarial predictions may be used in
sentencing, subject to Morris' limiting retributivism, "as a verifiable, scientific tool to distinguish between people already subject to the state's power
on other grounds." Id. at 45. See also PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA,
supra note 26, at 112-13.
Morris and Miller note that in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)
(psychiatric testimony of dangerousness admissible under Texas death penalty statute), both the Supreme Court majority and dissentients accepted
the limits on predictive accuracy in J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION
OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981): "the 'best' clinical research currently in existence indicates that psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than
one out of three predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period among
institutionalized populations that had both committed violence in the past...
and who were diagnosed as mentally ill." Id. at 47-49, quoted in Barefoot, 463
U.S. at 900 n.7.
See also J. FLOUD & W. YOUNG, DANGEROUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1981); J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE (1975).
Some recent medical studies have suggested that at least 90% of excessively violent persons are afflicted with brain dysfunction and neurological
defects, and that predictions of dangerousness may have legitimate bases in
strictly biological evidence. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1985, at A17, col. 1.
125. This point also indicates why strict economic approaches to
criminal justice have not gained much credence from policymakers. For
example, Richard Posner's positivist approach purposely excludes moral
costs. He assumes that criminal punishments are probability-scaled for efficiency and that they should reflect the uncertainty of apprehension and
conviction for each particular crime. In particular, where the probability of
apprehension and conviction is close to zero, penalties should be fixed far
below the cost of the offense regardless of the proportionality between
crime and punishment. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167 (2d
ed. 1977).
Much of the impersonality of the economic view flows from its peculiar
conceptual distinction between crimes and torts. Supposedly, tortfeasors
are more easily identified and sued than criminals are apprehended and
indicted. Therefore, a measure of punishment far beyond the compensation of victims of crimes is required. This reasoning has been sharply criticized: "In exchange for our credulity we are offered a panorama of the
law, both civil and criminal, which totally suppresses its moral values and
elevates the maximization of cash value to the position of the legal system's
sole raison d'etre." Adelstein, Institutional Functions and Evolution in the
Criminal Process, 76 Nw. UL. REV. 1, 61 (1981). For a discussion of libertarian views on the tort-crime distinction, see Drane & Neal, On MoralJustificationsfor the TortlCrime Distinction, 68 CAL L. REV. 398 (1980).
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The federal sentencing reform is part of a comprehensive crime control act. Rationally consistent sentencing principles should at the very least conform to those aims which
motivate the substantive provisions of the criminal
law-namely, the means of crime prevention. Crimes are not
denominated as such because society feels that offenders
should be punished; rather, society sanctions criminal behavior in order to further goals otherwise impeded by such behavior. A criminal, then, should be punished primarily because his behavior must be prevented, and not because he
simply deserves to be punished. An arsonist should be sent to
jail not to appease a collective conscience which has somehow
determined that he has merited incarceration, but ultimately
to prevent property from being burned up intentionally all
over town. The connection between igniting buildings and a
prison term is nowhere to be found in logic, whereas it is
quite logical that the threat and actuality of punishment will
curtail future occurrences of arson. Whether society realizes
this effect is another story and depends on factors which cannot be discerned readily though positive analysis, let alone be
brought about through prospective legislation.
Nevertheless, legislators can attempt forthrightly to order the purposes of sentencing so as to indicate a sincere
commitment toward implementing sentencing policy rationally, fairly, and in direct conjunction with crime prevention.
For if the purposes of sentencing are randomly selected, sentencing practices might as well be too.
The purposes of punishment expressed in the proposed
amendment reflect the concern that sentences bear a rational
relationship to crime control but burden the offender no
more or less than justice, tempered by mercy, demands in
light of his transgression."" The statement recognizes what
sentencing policy can feasibly achieve and what it should entertain only secondarily. Hence, before the United States
Sentencing Commission promulgates measures to ensure
more equitable and more responsible sentencing practices, it
might do well to adopt such a realistically ordered statement
of the purposes of sentencing so that federal sentencing
judges and all connected with the sentencing process will understand their functions clearly and act accordingly.
126.

For a discussion of the deterrence rationale in the context of
ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETER-

crime prevention and social control, see F.

RENcE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
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V.

CONCLUSION

The Sentencing Reform Act represents Congress' attempt to instill coherence among sentencing practices, and
the guidelines to be developed by the Federal Sentencing
Commission will provide a practical means to that goal. Beyond the guidelines, Congress has laid the seeds for a new
jurisprudence of sentencing by stating the purposes of sentencing and requiring that the guidelines adhere to those
purposes.
In view of the ponderous mandate which the new criminal law propounds, the Sentencing Commission should reconsider the stated purposes of sentencing (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation) in light of what
criminal punishment can and should accomplish, and what it
cannot and should not. The purposes of sentencing should be
ordered to reflect that society's punishment is justified primarily through its interest in deterring offenders (potential
and convicted) from crime and in incapacitating those offenders who present a risk of harm to society if they are left unfettered. These concerns are implicit in the substantive criminal law and merit foremost attention in the sentencing
decision. The concept of desert is denoted in presumptive
sentences and serves as a limitation for the imposition of penalties for particular criminal acts and offenders. The utilitarian principle of parsimony and opportunities for restitution
are likewise boundaries beyond which an essentially disutilitarian sentence should not stray. However, the notions
that like offenders be treated alike and that there be a link
between punishment and rehabilitation are appropriate guiding considerations, but these may be cast aside where they
conflict with the requirements of justice in a particular case,
and especially where they defeat the pervasive social objective
of crime control.
Within this theoretical framework, the sentencing guidelines and other reforms within the Act can operate together
as a pragmatic enterprise which can accommodate society's
need to vindicate the institution and practice of punishment,
along with the desire to morally rehabilitate offenders, without forfeiting the aim of doing justice for the individual offender in each case.

